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Abstract
Quian Quiroga et al. [Nature 435, 1102 (2005)] have recently discovered neurons that appear to have the characteristics of
grandmother (GM) cells. Here we quantitatively assess the compatibility of their data with the GM-cell hypothesis. We show
that, contrary to the general impression, a GM-cell representation can be information-theoretically efficient, but that it must be
accompanied by cells giving a distributed coding of the input. We present a general method to deduce the sparsity distribution of
the whole neuronal population from a sample, and use it to show there are two populations of cells: a distributed-code population
of less than about 5% of the cells, and a much more sparsely responding population of putative GM cells. With an allowance for
the number of undetected silent cells, we find that the putative GM cells can code for 105 or more categories, sufficient for them
to be classic GM cells, or to be GM-like cells coding for memories. We quantify the strong biases against detection of GM cells,
and show consistency of our results with previous measurements that find only distributed coding. We discuss the consequences
for the architecture of neural systems and synaptic connectivity, and for the statistics of neural firing.
Key words: Neural representations; grandmother cells; distributed coding;
1. Introduction
Critical to understanding how information is processed
in the brain is the form of the neural coding that under-
lies the storage and recall of memories. Is there a local,
or gnostic (Konorski, 1967), code — colloquially called a
grandmother-cell (GM-cell) representation — in which the
firing of a single neuron (or group of neurons) exclusively
codes recognition of a particular object, person or memory?
Or is the code much more distributed?
Although it is generally accepted [e.g., Churchland and Sejnowski
(1992)] that GM representations are not used in real-
ity, experiments (Hahnloser, Kozhevnikov and Fee, 2002;
Jung and McNaughton, 1993; Thompson and Best, 1989)
often find localist responses by individual neurons. Most
dramatically, Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) have recently
found many neurons in humans that, within the limits of
the measurements, behave like classic GM cells.
In this paper, we therefore quantitatively re-examine
the viability of GM-cell representations, with the out-
come that we refute the standard quantitative argu-
ments against them, both theoretical and phenomeno-
logical. The information-theoretic argument is that GM
representations need far too many neurons for the in-
formation coded (Rolls and Treves, 1998; Rolls, 2001;
Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992). We show that this ar-
gument fails when one examines the information storage
capacity of the synapses rather than the representational
capacity of neurons for input stimuli. The standard effi-
ciency argument applies only to the input representation,
needed to represent any of the myriad possible stimuli. For
storage, a GM representation can be optimally efficient.
The phenomenological argument is that GM cells should
fire in response to a much smaller fraction of stimuli
than has been deduced from measurements of neural re-
sponses (Hung et al., 2005; Abbott, Rolls and Tovee, 1996;
Waydo et al., 2006). A GM cell can be regarded as a cat-
egorizer, and the data appear to imply that any apparent
GM cell responds to many categories of stimuli rather than
to one category.
However, our information theoretic argument shows
that associated with any GM-cell population, with its
ultra-low sparsity, is a more conventional population with
a much higher sparsity. This two-population property, al-
ways a part of the GM-cell idea (Konorski, 1967; Page,
2000), was not allowed for in older analyses, including
that (Waydo et al., 2006) by the group responsible for the
new data (Quian Quiroga et al., 2005). We devise a very
general method of analyzing neural systems with multiple
sparsities, and apply it to the data of Quian Quiroga et al.
(2005). It enables us to quantify the biases against exper-
imental detection of GM-like cells, most of which simply
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appear as unreported silent cells, and whose estimated
numbers (Waydo et al., 2006; Henze et al., 2000; Buzsa´ki,
2004) —may be a factor of 30 more than the reported cells.
We find that the two-population property holds, and that
less than 5% of detected cells are in the distributed-code
population: the vast majority of the cells can be GM-like.
Then we find that the number of categories coded by the
GM-like cells can be 105 or more. Uncertainties are mi-
nor relative to the orders of magnitude involved. The data
of Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) therefore appear in strong
quantitative agreement with the GM-cell hypothesis.
The biases against detecting GMcells are enough to allow
consistency with previous (Abbott, Rolls and Tovee, 1996;
Waydo et al., 2006) measurements and analyses that use
a single-population model and that quantitatively argued
against GM cells. We will examine other arguments against
GM representations in the Discussion section.
2. GM systems
Inappropriate or excessively rigid definitions can
exclude biologically interesting cases. For example,
Rolls and Treves (1998, p. 12) define a local representa-
tion as one where “all the information that a particular
stimulus or event occurred is provided by the activity of
one of the neurons”. The word “all” appears to exclude
a system where a local representation codes the result of
testing a distributed representation of a stimulus against
remembered items. Not all the available information is in
the firing of the neurons in the local output representation.
Therefore in this section we present our definitions, and
explain important features and consequences of the defini-
tions needed for later sections.
2.1. Definitions
We define a set of cells to form a local or GM-like sys-
tem when nodes of the system can be divided into groups
of one or more nodes, and, to a good approximation, each
group corresponds to one particular meaningful and dis-
tinct property of the stimulus input to the system. Each
groupwe call a GM group. Typically we treat the properties
corresponding to different GM groups as being mutually
exclusive. We will usually identify the nodes with actual
neurons, so that measurement in one of a GM group’s cells
of firing above a suitable threshold is strong evidence that
the stimulus is associated with the corresponding property.
But it is also possible that the nodes could be, for example,
part of a dendritic tree. Then the correspondence between
neural firing and local coding might not be direct. In any
case we can treat the system as a categorization system.
In contrast, a distributed representation is formed by a
set of cells where the categorization can only be determined
from the activity of multiple cells/nodes and where the pat-
terns of activity overlap between distinct properties, even
when the properties themselves are mutually exclusive.
Classic GM cells and generalizations The classic exam-
ple of GM system is a facial identification system, where
the firing of a particular GM group mediates the “unitary
perception” (Konorski, 1967) of a retinal image as corre-
sponding to a particular individual person. A characteris-
tic property of a classic GM system is therefore that firing
is exclusive between different GM groups — i.e., only one
GM group is active at a time. This corresponds to the fact
that the individuals associated with the different stimuli
are themselves completely distinct. Of course, there will be
situations where the GM group firing is not completely ex-
clusive; for example, if a particular stimulus is ambiguous,
or if the picture of a face of one person is artificially mor-
phed into that of another person.
Our definition, however, was worded to allow certain
natural generalizations from the case of classic GM cells.
In particular, we will apply the terminology to declarative
memories in general (episodes, facts, etc). Thus we could
have a GM cell or GM group corresponding to each episodic
memory. In this case it is evidently of practical importance
for a memory to be recalled from a stimulus containing a
few components of the original memory. Since the same
components could be part of other memories, the pattern of
recognition firing need not be exclusive between memories.
Let us regard these patterns as priming the recall of the
memories. Full conscious recall of one particular memory
requires some extra cues and modulation. With a GM-like
memory system, non-exclusive priming recall would be at
a relatively low level of firing above some threshold, with
full recall involving exclusive firing at a much higher level.
In this case the exclusivity is not between the actual
firing of different GM groups, but between the concepts
corresponding to the groups. Of course, the situation is a
little more complicated for episodic memory, since episodes
are happenings along a continuum in time. A memory cell
for an episode corresponds to a small range in time. The
exclusivity between different GM groups is between well-
separated episodes, of which there are evidently a very large
number.
Another natural generalization of the GM-cell concept
is to local coding for output, with strong experimental
evidence in the work of Hahnloser, Kozhevnikov and Fee
(2002).
High-level GM systems v. low-level local coding We
choose to restrict our use of the “GM-cell” terminology to
the higher levels of neural processing. For lower levels, we
will use the broader term “local coding”; by this we mean
coding by a set of cells each of which is responsive to some
patch of stimulus space (with fall off at the edges natu-
rally). When the relevant properties of the stimulus are in
a low-dimensional space — as for color or position in an
environment — the collection of patches can give complete
coverage. But when the relevant stimulus space is high di-
mensional, one can only expect local coverage of a minute
fraction of possible stimuli — for example, to correspond
to linguistic phonemes out of all possible auditory stimuli.
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Fig. 1. Cell G is a classic GM cell that fires in response to a certain
kind of visual pattern (e.g., the face of a particular person). It
receives processed input from the top of a hierarchy that processes
raw sensory input. The GM cell passes recognition information to a
set of output cells, which could, for example, recall the name of a
recognized person.
There is considerable evidence that can be interpreted
as supporting some kind of local coding below the highest
perceptual levels. The key question for us is whether local
coding is also used at the highest levels.
Internal stimuli Input to a memory system need not
correspond to actual physical events external to the brain.
Some input can be completely generated internally, as
with an author planning a novel. Memories of people and
episodes in the novel have the same neural status as mem-
ories of real people and events.
2.2. Properties
One big computational advantage of a GM-like sys-
tem is the simplicity of information flow, Fig. 1, so
that the representation is easy to construct and ma-
nipulate — e.g., Gardner-Medwin and Barlow (2001);
Baum, Moody and Wilczek (1988). New memories are
formed with new or unallocated neurons, so that they inter-
fere minimally with old memories (Quartz and Sejnowski,
1997). The input to GM cells is from a distributed repre-
sentation of the stimuli. Output to downstream neurons
using the categorization can be simply taken from a single
GM cell.
Above-threshold firing of a GM-cell models a property of
the cause of the stimulus. Thus when firing is exclusive be-
tween different GM groups, this corresponds to exclusivity
between the modeled properties of the associated external
stimuli, like the identity of a person.
It is therefore tempting to use exclusivity of firing be-
tween different GM groups as the primary measurable cri-
terion for characterizingGM-like systems. But natural gen-
eralizations to declarative memory motivate us to relax this
criterion. For example, with episodic memories, a stimulus
may cause a response in nodes for those episodes having
important commonalities with the stimulus.
In addition, there can bemultiple categorization systems,
and there is no requirement of exclusivity between different
systems. This is particularly clear at low levels in the pro-
cessing hierarchy, where we could have separate local rep-
resentations, for example, of the color and shape of an ob-
ject. A collection of local representations of such relatively
low-level features then forms a distributed representation
of the whole object, suitable for input to the next level of
hierarchical processing.
Note that we prefer to use the terminology “GM-like
system” rather than “GM representation” to emphasize
two aspects: The first is that if the GM-cell idea applies
in its classic sense of recognition of individual people, it
is likely to apply much more generally to all declarative
memories.
The second is that we wish to treat the firing of a GM
cell as coding the result of a recognition computation from
a stimulus. But the use of the word “representation” for a
GM-like system would carry the connotation of represent-
ing the stimulus, which is not generally appropriate. If noth-
ing else, local coding typically dramatically fails to cover
the stimulus space. For example, consider a distributed in-
put representation on 100 binary neurons, a small number
compared with real sensory systems. There are 2100 ≃ 1030
distinct stimuli, many orders of magnitude larger than the
total number of neurons in any brain. A practical local rep-
resentation can only apply to a minute fraction of stimuli,
presumably ones that are especially salient. A local repre-
sentation can only provide full coverage for a stimulus space
of very low dimension, like that for color.
2.3. Detection of GM-like systems
Practical experiments only involve a limited number of
stimuli and cells, and definitely do not give the detailed
synaptic information that determines all possible causes of
a cell’s firing. Thus it is non-trivial to distinguish a GM
system from a distributed representation, when the dis-
tributed representation is sparse, and when we allow natu-
ral generalizations of the GM-cell idea.
We illustrate the issues by comparing two very differ-
ent computational memorymodels, one by Hopfield (2006),
and one by Baum, Moody and Wilczek (1988) (BMW).
Hopfield’s model In Hopfield’s particular example, the
input stimulus concerns properties of people, and the input
representation is carried by a set of 1000 binary neurons.
These are divided into 50 sets of 20 neurons. The 20 neurons
in each set give a local representation of 20 possible values
of a property of the stimulus. For example, to input the
name of a person, one of a set of 20 name-coding neurons
would be active. Binary synapses connect every neuron to
every other neuron.
Each stored memory is considered as the set of 50 prop-
erty values for a particular person, and is coded in the
state of the synapses. The synaptic strengths are set by a
Hebbian-like rule on presentation of stimuli.
Recall of a memory is caused by a stimulus that consists
of partial data about an individual, i.e., values for a subset
of the 50 properties. Memory retrieval results in completion
of a partial stimulus to the full set of properties for the
corresponding individual. There is no corresponding GM
cell; the model is a fully distributed memory system.
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Fig. 2. Architecture of BMW model in its most basic form.
BMWmodel The basic BMWmodel is the simplest pos-
sible form of a GM system: a feed-forward perceptron with
one intermediate memory-cell layer, Fig. 2. The memory
cells are arranged to respond in a GM-cell style to recog-
nize inputs that correspond to stored memories. The model
gains its power by applying it to the situation that the in-
put forms a sparse binary representation of stimuli. This
would typically be obtained from the top of a processing
hierarchy, as in Fig. 1. Improvements in the model can be
made, for example, by adding inhibitory interneurons to
enforce a winner-take-all action in the memory-cell layer,
but the simplest form of the model is sufficiently robust for
our illustration.
To solve the same pattern-completion task as Hopfield’s
model, we make the output cells identical to the input cells,
thereby specializing from a heteroassociative memory sys-
tem to a homoassociative system.
Memories are created by presenting a full stimulus to
the system, and arranging for some unallocated memory
neuron α to match its synaptic strengths to the stimulus.
The chosen neuron changes to a state of being allocated,
with correspondingly greatly reduced synaptic plasticity.
Let x(α) =
(
x
(α)
1 , . . . , x
(α)
1000
)
denote the prototype pattern
for memory neuron α. Then the strengths of the neuron’s
input synapses are set to a constant times the input pattern:
wα
j = Wx
(α)
j , and similarly for the output. The constant
W can be scaled out of all of our formulae, but its use assists
in relating the formulae to properties of real neurons.When
another stimulus x′ is presented, the response of neuron α
is obtained from a thresholded sum over its inputs:
rα = θ
(∑
j
wα
j x′j − Tα
)
. (1)
This formulation is for artificial analog neurons, but it is
readily generalized to realistic spiking neurons, and the
model is robust enough that minor variations do not affect
the principles governing its performance.
We now review how standard properties Kanerva (1988)
of sparse binary codes show that the system implements
the pattern completion task if the threshold is set suitably.
Let a stimulus x′ be presented; it may be some full pattern,
in which 5% of the input neurons are active, or it may be a
partial pattern. The input to neuron α is
∑
j wα
j x′j , which
is W times the overlap between x′ and the prototype pat-
tern for memory α, i.e., it measures the number of common
on-bits.
If the new stimulus is unrelated to memory α, then its
on-bits are random relative to those for memory α. Thus for
a full pattern the typical overlap is 5% of the total number
of on-bits in a full patten, i.e., 5%× 50 = 2.5, and less for
a partial pattern.
We therefore set the threshold intermediate between the
input for the full prototype pattern, i.e., 50W , and the
typical input for a full unrelated pattern, i.e., 2.5W . Then
unrelated patterns almost never cause neuron α to fire.
Thus with sparse input patterns we have the well-known
automatic orthogonalization against unrelated stimuli.
But now consider an input corresponding to a subset of
the features in memory α’s prototype pattern. For example,
a quarter of the features could have been detected. In that
case, the input to neuron α would be 14 × 50W = 12.5W .
Hence with an appropriate threshold setting, we get firing
of neuron α in response to a subset of the features in its
prototype pattern. This then causes firing of the whole set
of output neurons that correspond to the prototype, i.e.,
we have pattern completion.
Because the input to a memory cell is much bigger for
patterns related to its prototype than for unrelated pat-
terns, the operation of the system is robust against changes
in the exact equations describing its operation.
Measurements To mimic a biological experiment, one
could measure the responses of a sample of model neurons
to a sample of stimuli. In Hopfield’s model if there are fewer
than about 10 or 20 stimuli, the firing of many of the in-
dividual neurons would correspond to single people. Thus
the distributed nature of the memory representation would
not be immediately apparent.
But it is not necessary to enlarge the stimulus set to
test this. Data from a sample of neurons and stimuli give
the fraction of stimuli to which neurons respond. Then by
using knowledge of the capacity of the system, which in
this case is several hundred memories, one can statistically
extrapolate from the sample to show that each neuron is
responsive to multiple unrelated stimuli.
As for the BMW model, the input/output cells would
have the same kind response characteristics as all the cells
of the Hopfield model, responding to 5% of the stimuli. But
there are also GM memory cells, which respond much more
rarely. If the sample data include at least a few responsive
GM neurons, one can detect the different properties of the
input and GM cells, and thereby distinguish the system
from the Hopfield model.
In this paper, we will construct a method to extrapolate
in general from data with a sample of cells and stimuli to
the whole system. Themethod enables us to compute which
of the following properties of a set of putative GM cells is
consistent with data: (a) The cells actually could code for
single properties. (b) Each cell is expected to respond to
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multiple unrelated properties, after an extrapolation to the
full set of possible stimuli.
One confounding issue is that if one detects a response
from a GM-like cell it is easy to misidentify the property
corresponding to the cell’s firing. If a cell only responds,
within limited data, to a particular individual person, the
cell could indeed be a classic GM cell corresponding to that
person. But it could also be, for example, a GM cell for an
episodic memory that contains the person. In that case it
would respond to stimuli containing other components of
the episode.
The distinguishing feature of the most general kind of
GM-like cell, but one that can be hard to test, is that ap-
parently different stimuli that cause it to respond are in
fact related. In contrast, with a purely distributed repre-
sentation at the highest level, there is no high-level relation
between, for example, the multiple people causing a par-
ticular cell to respond. The only relation is an identity of
lower-level features in the input representation. The local-
ity is at the feature level, not at the high level.
3. Information requirements for pattern
recognition
We now quantify the information requirements for a
memory or categorization system. First we distinguish the
activity state and the storage state. The activity state is
the pattern of firing of the neurons, and the storage state
(Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992, p. 142) is the pattern of
synaptic connectivity and strengths.
Furthermore, within the activity state of a memory sys-
tem, we distinguish an input representation and a recogni-
tion representation. The input representation is of the cur-
rent input stimulus, like a visual scene, while the recogni-
tion representation concerns which stored pattern (if any)
corresponds to the current input.
3.1. Input representation
The immediate input to a memory system must be able
to represent the relevant features of any possible stimulus,
and not just those previously encountered stimuli for which
there is a memory trace. Here the standard arguments for
distributed representations apply unambiguously, and a
GM representation is not possible. The argument is simply
that N neurons code for at most N exclusive properties in
a GM system, but that they code for exponentially more
with a distributed representation, for example 2N with a
simple binary code.
In general the immediate input to a memory or catego-
rization system is not the raw sensory input but a highly
processed representation of those high-level features that
are relevant for the system’s particular task. For example,
input for face recognition could involve neurons coding for
the presence, shape and position of eyes, nose and mouth,
etc; individual features could well be coded locally, but the
collection of feature representations would always form a
distributed representation. Each neuron has a range of dis-
tinguishable firing rates, so that the raw information ca-
pacity in the activity of N neurons is a few times N bits.
But robustness requires a certain amount of redundancy,
and firing is often sparse, both of which reduce the informa-
tion per neuron. Measurements (Abbott, Rolls and Tovee,
1996) show that in hippocampal neurons about 0.3 bits of
independent information are coded per neuron and suggest
that a few hundred neurons suffice for coding possible faces.
For example, 300 neurons code about 100 bits, sufficient for
about 2100 ≃ 1030 different categories of face, an entirely
satisfactory number.
Note that once an input representation is sufficiently
small, pure representation efficiency is not a dominant con-
sideration. Issues of processing speed, metabolic efficiency,
and algorithmic robustness can be more important. For ex-
ample, sparse distributed representations appear to be fa-
vored (Rolls and Treves, 1998), since they can give weak
interference between memories during synaptic plasticity.
3.2. Storage in synapses
The information capacity in the storage state, i.e., in the
synapses, was estimated by Chklovskii, Mel and Svoboda
(2004) and by Stepanyants, Hof and Chklovskii (2002).
There are two contributions, from the synaptic topology
and from the synaptic strengths, giving a total of 5 to 10
bits of raw storage capacity per synapse. We divide by 10,
to provide a plausible allowance for redundancy. Thus we
need about one synapse for each bit of storage information.
This calculation uses only very basic physical informa-
tion about synapses and neural processing, so it is certainly
accurate at the order of magnitude level. Since measures of
information in units of bits are independent of the physical
implementation, the numbers are directly compared with
those for ordinary digital computers, and experience with
data processing and storage can be used to derive minimum
numbers of synapses for a task. A human brain has around
Ntot ≃ 1011 neurons and C ≃ 104 synapses per neuron.
So its synapses store about CNtot ≃ 1015 bits, i.e., about
105GByte, up to a factor of 10 or so.
3.3. Recognition representation and total stored
information
Suppose the system has a repertoire of R stored memo-
ries. Each is an arbitrary association of a category to stim-
ulus features. So we attribute to each memory A bits of
association information, which we term its semantics. This
includes both input and output information. (E.g., facial
structure and name for a person, and, in fact, all remem-
bered information about the person.) It is important to in-
clude output semantics in the associations, since they are
what allow the retrieval of a particular memory to cause
memory-specific behavior. These are quite arbitrary asso-
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ciations, for example of a linguistic name to a specific per-
son, and without such output associations there is no pur-
pose to storing a memory. The output associations do need
to be stored, and they therefore contribute to the calcula-
tion of the minimum size of the system just like the input
associations.
The total association information is RA bits, so that ap-
proximately this number of synapses is needed. For exam-
ple, with a repertoire of R = 5000 and an average of A =
10000 bits of information per item, we need about 5× 107
synapses. The measured number of synapses per neuron is
around 104, thereby implicating about RA/104 neurons,
i.e., a number proportional to the size of the system’s reper-
toire (and the information per memory trace).
Hence if the system uses R GM cells for a recognition
representation, this is at most a constant factor beyond the
neurons needed to carry the storage synapses. Moreover, if
A is larger than about 104, there is not even any overhead
at all in using GM cells. We can characterize this by saying
that if the memories are semantically rich, then a GM strat-
egy for the recognition output can be optimally efficient,
as in the model of Baum, Moody and Wilczek (1988).
In contrast, if one ignored the storage requirement, one
would assert that N recognition neurons can code expo-
nentially more recognized categories, e.g., 2N .
It is important that in quantifying the information the
term “bit” is used in the strict information theoretic sense.
This means that if each memory were coded as an actual bit
pattern, each of the 2A possible patternswould be equiprob-
able. Thus, on a computer, the bit count refers to an op-
timally compressed representation. However, only certain
features of the input are relevant for tasks like face identi-
fication: a minimalist line drawing often suffices for unam-
biguous identification. So in computer terms the association
bits are with respect to a representation that is both lossy
and compressed. In the opposite direction, it can be diffi-
cult to perform computations on optimally compressed rep-
resentations, and it is also difficult to measure accurately
the probabilities of occurrences of different kinds of stimuli,
since the number of possible stimuli far exceeds the num-
ber actually experienced. Moreover redundancy (in the in-
formation theoretic sense of using more than the minimum
necessary number of bits) is useful in giving robustness to a
system. For all these reasons, we must expect the physical
capacity of a system needed to code memories to be a sub-
stantial factor large than a minimal physical implementa-
tion of RA bits. Nevertheless this measure is important in
quantifying information in an implementation-independent
way. It also enables us to estimate the information stor-
age requirements by examining implementations of related
tasks on a digital computer.
Well-known examples of simple line drawings and pic-
tures of artificially low resolution show that the informa-
tion to identify faces could be quite modest, if a suitable
representation is used. But the synaptic size of the sys-
tem also depends on the remaining association informa-
tion, treated as output. This can be much larger in size,
effectively amounting to a biography of the individual con-
cerned in each memory.
3.4. Objections and answers
A number of objections to our bounds and ideas for evad-
ing them have been proposed, which we now answer. The
general answer is simply that the information theoretic
bound represents an absolute physical limit that it is im-
possible to exceed. All that is required is that we count the
bits of information in the strictly correct information theo-
retic sense, and that we have identified the correct physical
location of memory in the synapses.
Counting memories Does not the idea of quantifying
memories as discrete items that can be counted carry
the implication that we use a GM system? Are there not
difficulties in counting memories in distributed memory
systems? In fact the classical kinds of distributed mem-
ory, e.g., Hopfield (2006); Treves and Rolls (1991, 1992);
Amit, Brunel and Tsodyks (1994), are regarded as storing
patterns, which can be counted. What we do have in mind
is declarative, or explicit memory, the kind considered as
prototypically hippocampal. Here it is reasonably clear
what is meant by a single memory: a picture, a scene,
or the meaning of a word; all of these are discrete. Even
with episodic memory, where there is a continuous time
variable, we can observe that there is a correlation time
within a continuous series of events. As regards storage
requirements, we simply identify a single memory with the
happenings within a correlation time, which is evidently
of the order of seconds or minutes. Of course, only a small
fraction of these are stored in long term memory. We will
not require great precision here.
In the contrasting case of implicit procedural memory,
it is much less obvious what should be defined as a single
memory item. But we are not concerned with this case.
Multiplexing Could not one gain by allowing a neuron
to respond to multiple different stimuli? Could not a sin-
gle face-identification cell respond to either George Bush,
Jennifer Aniston or John Hopfield, for example? This mul-
tiplexing is just going in the direction of a distributed rep-
resentation. Our argument so far does not rule that out; all
it says is that this does not provide a way of reducing the
synapse count. It is our statistical argument in later sec-
tions that enables us to estimate the degree of multiplexing.
Now if a neuron responds to multiple categories, then
there is interference at the neural level between different
memory traces. An unambiguous categorization then re-
quires the use of the firing information from more than one
neuron. In the case of lightweight memories, i.e., with sub-
stantially less than 10000 bits of associations per memory,
multiplexing of memories can indeed reduce the neuron
count, and is allowed by our general argument. But with
richer memories, there is no gain.
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Representation v. memory The memories we have dis-
cussed are typified by hippocampal memories. Consider in-
stead visual area V1; the number P of distinguishable acti-
vation patterns is exponential in the number N of neurons,
e.g., P = 2N . An outside observer could identify different
faces from the different activation patterns. Why should
we not regard this as memory, if we are to regard observa-
tion of (much simpler) activation patterns in GM cells as
identifying faces, and as in fact part of a memory system?
The difference is not in the outside observations, but in
the use the organism itself makes of the information. A
memory is not useful unless it produces some consequence
when recalled. What we mean, for example, is that seeing
John Hopfield on the other side of a street might induce us
to cross the street and greet him by name. For the billions
of other possible people, there would be either be a different
response or no response at all.
This is why we defined the associations for a memory to
include output as well as input. There must be sufficient
information stored to enable the relevant computation to
be done from the activation pattern corresponding to the
stimulus.
Without being concerned with storage, it is perfectly
possible to compare one activation pattern with a previous
one, to identify whether or not it has changed. But to com-
pare it with patterns of activation for all the people one
remembers, and to take appropriate actions, one needs ap-
propriate storage. It is simply not possible to evade the fun-
damental physical necessities given by information theory.
Coding commonalities Many remembered faces have fea-
tures in common. Cannot this be used to reduce the num-
ber of synapses and neurons needed, by coding the common
features in a special subsystem for the common features?
Suppose we had a set of faces characterized by very short,
dark, and curly hair. Would there not be a gain by allo-
cating a neuron to this combination of characteristics and
using it instead of separate neurons for hair length, color
and curliness?
If the different hair features were equiprobable and un-
correlated, the general argument would prevent any gain.
As an example, suppose each of the three hair characteris-
tics has 8 equiprobable values, for 83 = 512 distinguishable
combinations. If all the combinations were equiprobable,
we would allocate 9 bits for the information content. Prob-
ability here refers to a prior probability of occurrence, i.e.,
before the creation of a memory trace.
But if instead all the characteristics were perfectly cor-
related, then there would only be 8 combinations, which
could be represented in 3 bits. When we construct memo-
ries, this gives a gain of a factor of 3 in storage if we only
represent the combinations that actually occur in the input
representation rather than all possible combinations.
But this is exactly what is meant by using a correct
measure of information to compute the minimum number
of synapses. Note that the task carried out by a memory
system is not merely to identify the best fit to a current
stimulus among stored memories; for that very few bits are
needed. For example, if a stimulus is represented by 100
bits, but only 8 memories are stored, then only log2 8 = 3
suitably coded bits are needed to identify the stimulus, if
it is assumed that the stimulus corresponds to one of the
memories. But it is also necessary to identify the case that
the stimulus fails to correspond to a stored memory, so that
it is a candidate for a new memory. It is for this that the
other 97 bits are needed.
3.5. Comparison with models
Although our argument was used to show that GM
coding can be optimally efficient in the use of synapses
and neurons, the bounds on synapse and neuron num-
ber are independent of the coding method. It is therefore
useful to verify that the bounds are obeyed by the polar
opposite of GM systems, i.e., by conventional distributed
memory systems. Calculations of the capacity of such sys-
tems have been made, e.g., Treves and Rolls (1991, 1992);
Amit, Brunel and Tsodyks (1994), and it can be checked
that they do obey our bounds. But what appears to have
been missed is that the capacity limit also removes the
argument against using GM cells.
Hopfield’s recent model (Hopfield, 2006) provides an ex-
cellent example. In this model, each stored memory corre-
sponds to the values of each of 50 categories, with 20 pos-
sible values per category. This gives a total of 50 log2 20 =
216 bits of information. Retrieval of a memory results in
a neural representation of this information in the firing of
50 out of 1000 binary neurons, for a biologically realistic
sparsity of 5%.
Storage is in binary synapses with all-to-all connectiv-
ity on the 1000 neurons, for a total of slightly under 106
bits of storage capacity. This implies that the system can
store at most 106/216 ≃ 4500 separate memories. In fact,
the simulations in Hopfield (2006) show that, with the al-
gorithms used in that paper, performance noticeably de-
grades when about 250 memories, i.e., a factor of 20 below
the physical limit. Thus the information-theoretic bounds
are obeyed. The problem is that the memories are stored on
the synapses connecting the active neurons in a particular
memory. Synapses overlap between memory traces, which
causes interference if too many memories are stored.
Consider in contrast the BMWmodel (Baum, Moody and Wilczek,
1988), which, as observed by its authors, is optimal in its
number of synapses. Suppose for input and output we use
the same 1000 neurons as in the distributed model. Then to
store N memories we add N memory neurons and 2000N
synapses (for input and output). We also may use a rela-
tively few extra interneurons and synapses to implement
winner-take-all dynamics.
The number of synapses is double ourminimum estimate,
because we treat input and output semantics separately:
they could be different. This is much more efficient than the
distributed model. There is also an extra neurons for each
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memory. But we can readily increase the capacity for stored
memories by increasing the number of memory neurons.
WithN = 500, we would have the same number of synapses
as in Hopfield’s model, 50% more neurons, but double the
capacity.
With the distributed model, the capacity can be in-
creased only either by simply duplicating the system,
which is always a possibility, or by a change in architecture.
An appropriate change in architecture would be to use the
original input neurons to feed a separate layer which codes
the same information more sparsely, after the style of a
support vector machine.
Note that the BMW model reliably performs the same
pattern completion task as Hopfield’s model. That is, a
stimulus consisting of a few values is completed to the val-
ues of all categories for the corresponding memory. The
BMW model essentially performs a comparison of the ac-
tive bits in the sparse input pattern with the on-bits in the
stored pattern. Because of the 5% sparseness of the input,
the probability that an on-bit in the stimulus coincides with
an on-bit in an unrelated stored pattern is also 5%. Once
more than a few bits are examined, the probability of a
chance coincidence is extremely small, with a correspond-
ingly small misidentification probability.
4. Statistics of neural responses
4.1. Two-population property of GM systems
We have seen that the efficiency argument against GM
cells disappears, especially for semantically rich objects,
like most people’s grandmothers. But the efficiency anal-
ysis for the input representation shows that the GM cell
population is necessarily accompanied by a population of
cells carrying a distributed code.
Experimental characterizations of the different kinds of
coding can be made by measuring the sparsity of neural
responses to stimuli.
By sparsity we mean, for each cell, the fraction of
stimuli to which it responds. We assume that, as in
Quian Quiroga et al. (2005), some threshold criterion is
defined cell-by-cell as to whether a cell responds or not.
Thus the neuron is treated as binary. Other definitions in-
volving analog firing rates are possible, but we will not use
them. Note that with our definition and when all cells have
the same sparsity, both the population and the lifetime
sparsity are equal, unlike the case (Willmore and Tolhurst,
2001) with other definitions of sparsity.
For a system with fully distributed coding, we expect
to measure sparsities characteristic of the input and out-
put representations. For example, in Hopfield’s model, the
sparsity is exactly 5%. More realistically, there will be a
range of sparsity.
The input and output cells of a GM system will have
naturally have similar sparsities to those of all the cells in
a distributed-memory system. But the GM cells must re-
spond much more rarely. So with a GM system we expect
there to be two very different populations of cells distin-
guished by one population having a dramatically smaller
sparsity than the other. Whether or not the two popula-
tions are in the same area of the brain is not determined by
general arguments. But we will find that, in fact, the puta-
tive GM cells of Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) do have an ac-
companying distributed-code population. For our purposes
it will be unimportant whether the detected distributed-
code population is the one that provides the actual input
and output for the detected GM-like cells.
Expectations for the sparsity of GM cells can be provided
in terms of the repertoire size of a system, which has a
connection to behavioral data.
There are two somewhat different kinds of memory sys-
tem we will consider. One is typified by face recognition,
where a recognized input is categorized into one of R cate-
gories, corresponding to distinct persons; recognition is ex-
clusive between categories. Then for a random sample of
faces in the repertoire of the system the sparsity of the GM
cells is 1/R, if we assume that each person is allocated the
same number of cells.
The second case is for declarative memory (episodes,
facts, etc). Recall is by a stimulus containing a few compo-
nents of the original memory. Since the same components
could be part of other memories, the pattern of recogni-
tion firing need not be exclusive between memories. Let us
regard these patterns as priming the recall of the memo-
ries. Full conscious recall of one particular memory requires
some extra cues and modulation. With a GM system, non-
exclusive priming recall would be at a relatively low level
of firing above some threshold, with full recall involving ex-
clusive firing at a much higher level.
In a memory system, a typical stimulus can evoke multi-
ple memories. If we let nm typify the number of memories
evoked, then a given GM neuron is caused to fire by a frac-
tion nm/R of stimuli. It is therefore convenient to define an
effective repertoire size Reff = R/nm, so that the typical
sparsity is 1/Reff.
From standard psychological data, we envisage that Reff
is thousands to at least millions for interesting cases.
In contrast, the distributed-code cells fire much more
frequently; this is known from data, and is necessary in
order that this population can represent a sufficiently large
number of stimuli.
4.2. General form of distribution of neural responses
Measurements of single-cell responses concern only a
small fraction of cells and of all possible stimuli. So we will
treat data as being from a sample over cells and stimuli,
and deduce properties of the whole system: e.g., the relative
sizes of the cell populations and their sparsities, and hence
the number of categories coded for by the GM population.
In doing this, we will quantify, and hence compensate for,
the strong biases against detection of GM cells.
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Suppose we present a sample of p stimuli that are ran-
domly chosen from some broad class (e.g., pictures of fa-
mous people, images concerning movies that the subject
has watched, pictures of buildings). Any particular cell i
responds to some fraction of these, called the cell’s (life-
time) sparsity αi. The number ni of stimuli that evoke a
response by the cell is taken from a binomial distribution
of mean αini:
P (n, celli) = α
n
i (1− αi)p−n
p!
n! (p− n)! . (2)
This simply corresponds to the probability that n of the
stimuli are in the response-causing class and p − n are in
the non-response-causing class, as regards cell number i.
These two classes of stimuli form fractions αi and 1−αi of
the whole set of stimuli.
We now consider a sample of cells, thereby sampling the
distribution of sparsity over cells, D(α). This means that
the fraction of cells with sparsity α to α + dα is D(α)dα.
Then the probability of getting n responses to the p stimuli
in some random chosen cell is obtained by integrating the
single cell response with the sparsity distribution:
P (n|p) =
∫ 1
0
dαD(α)αn(1− α)p−n p!
n! (p− n)! (3)
This is a general result. The only necessary assumption is
that the cells are randomly chosen out of some more global
set of neurons (e.g., hippocampus) and that the stimuli are
randomly chosen out of some global class.
The value of α for a cell and the distribution D(α) de-
pend both on the choice of stimulus class and on the choice
of the threshold for a response. Changing either will natu-
rally affect the distribution. For the data we analyze, the
response criterion is given in Quian Quiroga et al. (2005).
If multiple sessions and multiple subjects are considered,
Eq. (3) continues to apply, withD(α) being the distribution
averaged over subjects. So this form is amenable for the
analysis of aggregated data.
Observe also that the derivation of the formula does not
require any assumption about the independence of the fir-
ing of different neurons: the formula is simply an average
over all neurons in whatever area is being sampled. This
allows the formula to be completely general, in contrast
to the model of Waydo et al. (2006), which requires that
neuron-neuron correlations be neglected.
A common ansatz, as inWaydo et al. (2006), is to assume
a fixed sparsity a1, i.e., to set D(α) = δ(α − a1). Such
a model we term a single-population model. But for an
analysis of a possible GM population, we must allow for at
least two populations.
From amathematical point of view, Eq. (3) expandsP (n)
in basis functions, with expansion coefficients D(α). The
significance to its use is four fold: (1) It relates the distribu-
tions for different pattern numbers p via a common set of
expansion coefficients D(α). (2) The expansion coefficients
are non-negative. (3) For a distributed-code population to
represent all possible stimuli, efficiency is important, i.e,
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Fig. 3. (a) Qualitative expectation for distribution of sparsity over
cells with a GM population and a distributed-code population. (b)
Idealization with fixed sparsity for distributed-code population. For
a GM population with a large repertoire, its sparsity is too close
to α = 0 for the left hand peak to be be shown correctly scaled on
these graphs.
using the minimum of neurons. This will tend to maximize
the sparsity subject to other constraints like keeping rel-
atively low the metabolic costs (Lennie, 2003) of action-
potential generation. Thus we should expect the sparsity of
the distributed-code population to vary over a fairly nar-
row range. (4) Any GM population has an extremely small
sparsity, so that it populates just the bins with n = 0 and
n = 1 responses to the p stimuli.
Therefore the two population property leads to the qual-
itative expectation forD(α) that is shown in Fig. 3(a). The
distribution of responsesP (n) can be regarded as a smeared
version of the sparsity distribution D(α) with α = n/p.
Given this smearing, a useful approximation is to replace
the distributed-code peak by a delta function at some fixed
typical sparsity, Fig. 3(b).
4.3. Useful approximations
Although numerical work can always be done with the
linear combination of binomial distributions Eq. (3), we
find it convenient to use one of two approximations. First,
they allow simple analytic calculations, with a consequent
ease of understanding what features of the data are impor-
tant in determining particular parameters in a model of the
sparsity distribution D(α). Second, they also exhibit that
for sufficiently small sparsity there is a degeneracy in fit-
ting D(α): only certain combinations of model parameters
are determined. We verify that whenever we use these ap-
proximations in our fits, they agree sufficiently accurately
with the underlying binomial distribution.
When the sparsity is small, the binomial distribution for
a cell’s responses is approximately Poisson:
P (n, celli) ≃ (pαi)ne−pαi 1
n!
. (4)
This is derived by the use of Stirling’s approximation, and is
valid when αi ≪ 1 and p≫ 1, which is true in all the cases
we treat. The approximation depends only on the product
pαi and not on p and αi separately.
When the sparsity is so small that we can neglect the
probability of getting two or more responses, we can use
what we call the GM-cell approximation:
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P (n, celli) ≃


1− p/Reff if n = 0,
p/Reff if n = 1,
0 otherwise,
(5)
where we have replaced the ultra-small sparsityαi by 1/Reff
to relate it to our expectations for the sparsity of GM cell
responses.
5. Data analysis
Wenow analyze themeasurements byQuian Quiroga et al.
(2005). For each of their experimental subjects, there was
first a screening session in which a large number of dis-
parate images were presented. This was sufficient to detect
responsive cells, but not to measure their selectivity. Then
there was a testing session that probed the selectivity by
using many different images of the same people and objects
to which responses were found in the screening session. We
will find useful population information from the screening
session data alone.
It would be a big mistake to include the testing session
data in our analysis, since the images for a testing session
were systematically chosen to concern people and objects
whose images evoked a response in the previous screening
session. The distribution D(α) would be different in the
two sessions. For example, suppose that in the screening
session three images of Brad Pitt, Jennifer Aniston and
Halle Berry evoked responses from three classic GM cells.
These cells have a very small sparsity 1/R with respect to
images of people, with R being the subject’s repertoire for
recognizing faces. Then in a testing session that uses equal
numbers of images for just these three people, each of the
three GM cells would respond to one third of the images.
Thus with respect to the new, specially chosen stimulus
class, these cells have sparsity 1/3.
We use the following data:
– Recordings were made from 343 single units and 650
multi-units. Given the substantial number of single units,
we propose that the multi-units on average correspond to
2.5 neurons, to give a total of approximately 2000 cells,
250 in each of 8 patients.
The number 2000 is for cells that produced some de-
tectable signal. However there are many more cells that
are within range of detection by the extracellular elec-
trodes used but that failed to give any identified ac-
tion potentials (Quian Quiroga, private communication
and Waydo et al. (2006); Henze et al. (2000); Buzsa´ki
(2004)). Thus we should increase the number of cells by
some factor K, whose value we will estimate later. Then
the total number of cells available for detection is 2000K;
any of these would have been detected if it had given
action potentials at rates comparable to that of the ac-
tually detected cells. Our numerical results will have a
very simple scaling with K.
– There were on average p = 93.9 stimuli in each screening
session.
– A total of 132 units produced a response above threshold.
– Of these, 51 were candidate GMcells, i.e., they responded
to a single image within the screening session.
– The remaining 81 were not so highly selective.
– On average, the responsive units responded to 3.1% of
the presented images, i.e., to 2.9 images.
Given the low fraction of responsive units, we assume that
an above-threshold response from a multi-unit is a response
from one particular cell.
We will analyze the data with the aid of our general
expansion, (3). Since we wish to test compatibility with
the GM cell hypothesis, we arrange our analysis without
any initial assumption about the necessary existence of GM
cells:
(i) First we attempt to make a fit with a conventional
distributed-code model with a fixed sparsity.
(ii) When we find this fails to be a good fit, we add a
second component of different sparsity, as a minimal
model to fit the data.
(iii) The second component turns out to have such small
sparsity that only its responses for n = 1 are signifi-
cant.
(iv) This is suggestive that there are indeed cells that
approximate GM cells. So we reanalyze the data in
terms of a model of GM-like cells together with a
distributed-code population, so as to determine ap-
propriate properties of the GM-like population. This
makes it easy to allow for issues like the stimuli being
or not being in the system’s repertoire.
5.1. Single distributed-code population
We first try a model of a single distributed-code
population with a single sparsity a. This is the model
(Rolls and Treves, 1998) normally used in theoretical work
on autoassociative networks. It corresponds to a term
fDδ(α − a) in the general formula (3). Here fD is the
fraction of cells in this population, with the remaining
neurons being silent. (The most conventional versions, as
in Waydo et al. (2006), assume fD = 1.) In the Poisson
approximation, the probability that a particular neuron
is in the distributed-code population and that it fires in
response to n out of p presented images is
P (n & D) ≃ fD (pa)n e−pa 1
n!
. (6)
In view of a possible GM-cell population, which would
appear almost entirely at n = 1 and n = 0, we fit the two
parameters of the population with data from those cells
that give n ≥ 2 responses. In App. A we give more details
of the model including its later elaboration to include a
GM population, and obtain formulae for two measurable
quantities. One, P (n ≥ 2), is the probability of getting
2 or more responses from a cell; its experimental value is
81/(2000K). The second quantity is the mean value of n
for these cells, which we write as 〈n〉n≥2; its experimental
value is obtained from
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Fig. 4. Distribution of cells with a particular number of responses.
The dark bars correspond to the fitted distributed population and
the light bar is the excess of data above the distributed-population
contribution. Note that the published data (Quian Quiroga et al.,
2005) only enable us to obtain the sum of the bins with n ≥ 2 and
the mean of n restricted to these bins. So the dark bars represent
how cells with a distributed coding would give these responses.
〈n〉n≥1 P (n ≥ 1) = 1× P (1) + 〈n〉n≥2 P (n ≥ 2). (7)
Hence, from the data
〈n〉n≥2 = 2.9× 132
81
− 51
81
= 4.1. (8)
From Eqs. (A.4) and (A.5) we find that the distributed cells
are a fraction
fD = 4.6%
1
K
(9)
of all cells, and that pa = 3.7. Hence the sparsity is
a =
3.7
93.9
= 4%, (10)
independently of the value of the factor K for the num-
ber of silent cells. Given the expected statistical errors on
the data, due to finite size samples, the relative error on
these numbers is about 20%. We now have a complete ex-
perimentally determined prediction for the distribution of
responses in the distributed population, the dark bars in
Fig. 4.
Given this fit with rather sparsely firing cells, we find the
numbers of cells in this population that give zero and one
responses:
Frac. of all cells Num. of cells
n = 0 0.11% 2± 1.5
n = 1 0.41% 8± 3
n ≥ 2 4.1% 81± 9
(11)
These are an extrapolation from n ≥ 2 using a natural
model for sparse distributed coding. The errors are just
from the sampling statistics: Given the population param-
eters, the standard deviation of the number of cells, Nn, in
each bin is just
√
Nn.
The measured number of cells in the n = 1 bin is 51, far
in excess of the extrapolation. Even if there is a distribution
of sparsity for different cells in the distributed-code pop-
ulation, this cannot change this deduction greatly: a cell
that fires in response to at least several percent of stimuli
is likely to be detected, and relatively few distributed-code
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Fig. 5. The predicted distribution of firing of cells when p = 500
stimuli are used with the same model parameters as in Fig. 4. The
distribution is now bimodal, with a clear gap between the distributed
population response and the GM response, now off-scale, at n = 1.
cells give just n = 1 and n = 0 responses to the ∼ 100 pre-
sented stimuli. We also note that only around 2% of the
distributed-code cells fail to get detected: these are the cells
in the n = 0 bin. When they are in range of the electrodes,
detection of the distributed-code cells is almost unbiased.
We deduce from the excess at n = 1 that there is strong
evidence for a second population of ultra-sparsely firing
cells, just as predicted by general considerations if there
is a GM system. The null model, with only a distributed
population of cells together with completely silent cells,
appears to be ruled out. Fig. 4 and our conclusion about the
n = 1 excess are independent of the number of undetected
silent cells. They are also independent of any assumption
that the cells in the second population are actual GM cells.
Similar evidence for an excess of sparsely firing cells has
perhaps been found by Barnes et al. (1970). Their Fig. 8
shows an excess for some but not all hippocampal-related
areas in the rat.
Of course, a better extrapolation could be made if ex-
perimental values of P (n) as a function of n were available.
We could imagine several populations of input cells, acti-
vated by different kinds of image, so an improved model is
a combination of several distributions of the form (6), as in
Eq. (3).
It has been said that in order to deduce the two pop-
ulation property from a plot such as Fig. 4, the distribu-
tion must necessarily be bimodal. Obviously, if we have a
bimodal distribution, the inference would be cleanest and
without theoretical prejudice. We illustrate this in Fig. 5,
where we apply a two-population model described below to
predict the responses to p = 500 stimuli. There is a GM-
cell response that remains at n = 1. With a more limited
set of stimuli, we need a theoretical expectation for the
distributed-code population to extrapolate to n = 1 from
the data, so as to quantify a possible excess at n = 1. Note
however that if the distributed-code population had a dis-
tribution of sparsity rather than one fixed sparsity, the peak
in Fig. 5 would be spread out.
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5.2. Initial two-population model
To fit the data we need a minimum of one more popula-
tion of cells, evidently of much lower sparsity than the first
population. Without making any initial hypothesis about
its GM-like nature we try the following ansatz for the spar-
sity distribution:
D(α) = (1 − fD) δ(α − a′) + fD δ(α − a). (12)
where we preserve notation from the previous section, and
resolve the ambiguity between exchanging the definitions
of the two populations by requiring a′ < a. This model
has three parameters to be fit to three available measured
quantities: the fraction of cells with 1 response, the fraction
of cells with 2 or more responses, and the mean number
of responses. Within the Poisson approximation, which is
always good, and with the restriction to the 2000 detected
cells, we need to solve the following equations
N1
N
= (1− fD)xe−x + fDye−y, (13)
N1 +N≥2
N
= 1− (1− fD)e−x − fDe−y, (14)
〈n〉n≥1 (N1 +N≥2)
N
= (1− fD)x+ fDy. (15)
From the data, we use N = 2000, N1 = 51, N≥2 = 81, and
〈n〉n≥1 = 2.9. The fit parameters are fD, and the combina-
tions x = pa′ and y = pa. From this we find
x = 0.0224, y = 3.717, fD = 0.95, (16)
so that the sparsities are
a′ = 2.3× 10−4, a = 0.039. (17)
The sparsity of the extra population is so low that it popu-
lates only the n = 1 (and n = 0) bins to a good approxima-
tion, even though it concerns 95% of the neurons. Thus the
properties of the higher sparsity population are essentially
unchanged from the single-population fit, which confirms
our original choice to fit it to the data concerning cells with
2 or more responses to stimuli.
It now becomes useful to analyze the lower sparsity pop-
ulation in terms of a GM-cell approximation (5). This will
give us a simple way of determining whether the popula-
tion’s properties are appropriate for true GM cells. Very
importantly, it will also give us a simple way of treating
certain variations in the population’s properties that are
appropriate in the GM-cell context, and of allowing for the
silent-cell correction factor K.
5.3. Detailed two-population model
We therefore model the responses of the cells by a pop-
ulation that uses a conventional distributed code supple-
mented by a possible GM-cell population, as illustrated in
Fig. 6, these comprising fractions fD and fGM of the total
number of cells. The remaining cells do not respond to any
stimuli at all in the class used (which we label as “faces”,
D
1−k
k
Stimuli
known
unknown
Df GMf−1−
fGMfD
Cells
non−face
GM
Fig. 6. Classes of neurons and stimuli in a simple model with GM-like
cells. A fraction fGM of the facially-responsive cells are GM-like. A
second fraction, fD, fire in a distributed and less selective fashion.
The remaining cells do not respond to any facial stimuli. A fraction
k of the stimuli are in the repertoire of the GM cells.
even though some stimuli used in Quian Quiroga et al.
(2005) were of other kinds); this fraction 1 − fD − fGM is
completely silent for the purposes of the experiment. We
let k be the fraction of the images used which correspond
to a memory in the GM population.
Our model corresponds to a case of the general expan-
sion Eq. (3), in which we use just two delta-functions in
D(α), as in Fig. 3, with the GM-cell approximation (5) used
for the low sparsity population. To this we add a possible
population of absolutely silent cells, i.e., a term in D(α) at
exactly α = 0.
As explained earlier, we let Reff be the effective size of
the population’s repertoire, i.e., the repertoireR divided by
the number of simultaneously evoked memories. For classic
GM cells Reff = R, of course. Then a randomly chosen GM
cell has a sparsity k/Reff, i.e., the probability for the image
to be in the system’s repertoire times the probability to
respond to an image in the repertoire. When 2000K cells
are each presented with (an average of) p = 93.9 images of
different people or objects, the expected number of GM-like
responses is therefore 2000×K×93.9×fGM×k/Reff. This
number we found to be 43. In fact the choice of images was
made after interviews with the subjects (Quian Quiroga,
private communication), to put them in the repertoires of
the subjects, so we now set k = 1, to find
Reff ≃ 4400fGMK. (18)
Now fGM is less than 1− fD = 0.95 to 1, depending on the
value of K. It is useful to define Rˆ = Reff/(KfGM), which
is the combination of parameters actually determined by
data. Then Reff < (1− fD)Rˆ = 4400K − 200.
If we ignored the silent-cell issue and setK = 1 we would
find that at most 4200 categories are coded for. Now the
detected cells are in areas like the hippocampus that ob-
viously perform additional functions besides face recogni-
tion. Also, the repertoire of humans for faces and many
other categories is very much larger, as measured behav-
iorally (Dudai, 1997). This would appear to imply that the
detected GM-like cells are not classic GM cells. However:
– The hippocampus is not the ultimate store of long term
memory, so that the repertoire should be perhaps only a
12
year’s worth.
– The fraction of GM cells, fGM for the chosen stimulus
class could be less than 1−fD. The remaining cells would
not respond to any stimuli in the class (e.g., images of
faces); they might be distributed-code cells or GM cells
for other classes of stimuli. Extrapolating results on im-
ages of faces to other stimuli is sensible, so we would
expect the vast majority of cells, up to a few percent
corrections to be in whatever GM-like population is ap-
propriate, so that the upper limit on Reff found above is
appropriate to be applied to the whole GM population
and not just those of the facially-responsive kind.
– Very familiar people might have more neurons allocated
to them, as required by the storage requirements, and
some of these could be GM cells. So the assumption of
equal GM-cell populations for each category could easily
be false, so that the estimate of categories (e.g., 4200K)
is only about those categories which are highly familiar
to the subjects, which brings improved plausibility.
– There could be an experimental bias in cell selection.
We made a basic assumption that the cells probed were
a random sample in these areas. But the properties of
epilepsy and the selection of suitable subjects for study
might be such that the electrodes are in areas preferen-
tially responsive for visual images of people. In that case,
the category count refers to a restricted set of stimuli,
improving the plausibility.
– An interesting possibility is that the cells are not classic
GM cells but code for memories in a GM style, as in the
model of Baum, Moody and Wilczek (1988). This is of
course a natural hypothesis for the hippocampus, if we
grant the GM cell idea at all.
Then 1/Reff , as estimated above, is the average frac-
tion of recent memories that concern the people pictured
in the images. Reff will be biased to relatively low values
since the images were chosen to be of people well-known
to the subjects.
If the cells were classic GM-cells, we can estimate the
number of cells per exclusive category. There are roughly
107 cells in one region of the human hippocampus. Dividing
by 4200K gives the number of cells per category, about
2500/K. With K = 1 this appears rather large. But with
the large value ofK that we will calculate later, the number
is quite modest.
Finally, from the fraction fD = 4.6%/K of non-GM cells,
we deduce that they number about 5×105/K. An undoubt-
edly excessively simple idea is to identify them with the
input representation. This number could obviously much
higher than the few hundred that are perhaps needed at
a minimum for coding features relevant for face identifica-
tion. But there must obviously be many other specialized
and less specialized kinds of distributed input representa-
tion, as well as distributed output representations.
Beyond approximating the general sparsity distribution
D(α) by a sum of a small number delta functions, our calcu-
lations used the Poisson approximation for the distributed-
code population and the GM approximation for the ultra-
low sparsity population. We have verified that using the
full binomial distribution does not significantly affect the
results.
5.4. Silent-cell correction
The experimental estimates of the numbers of single and
multiple units in Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) depended on
detection of spikes from the neurons, even if the spike num-
bers never passed the limit for the defined threshold for
a responsive neuron. However, within detection range of
the extracellular electrodes used are many cells that never
give a detected signal. Waydo et al. (2006) state that in the
data 1–5 units are identified per electrode and they cite
Henze et al. (2000) for an estimate that that 120–140 neu-
rons are within detection range. To get a first estimate we
can say that on average 2 units are detected per electrode
out of 130 possible neurons, so that the neuronal popula-
tion is about 65 times the number of units.
We already estimated that about the number of neurons
detected in Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) was about twice
the number of units, to give a total of about 2000 detected
neurons. So we should further multiply the number of neu-
rons by K = 65/2 ≃ 30, for a total of 60 000 neurons in
range of detectability.
This increase does not affect our estimate of the spar-
sity of the response of the distributed-code neurons; that
stays at 4%. It also does not affect our estimate of the
relative numbers of detected cells in our two populations
(distributed-code v. GM-like). But it does drastically de-
crease the fraction of the distributed-code population to
4.6%/K ≃ 0.015%.
Most importantly it increases our estimate of the num-
ber of categories coded. The basic quantity here is Reff ≃
4400K ≃ 105. Given the roughness of our calculations, this
is probably accurate to a factor of 2 or so. The key issues
concern the orders of magnitude.
6. Comparison with previous measurements of
distributed representations
6.1. Waydo et al.
Waydo et al. (2006) work with data that is evidently
a superset of the data that the same group published in
Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) and to which we made a two-
population fit. Theymake a fit with a one-populationmodel
that is the same as ours in the special case that all detected
cells are in the distributed-code population: fGM = 0, fD =
1. One superficial difference is that they use the exact bino-
mial distribution instead of the analytically more tractable
Poisson approximation; this makes a negligible difference
for the small sparsities in question. Another difference is
that they normalize to units rather than neurons; but this
only results in trivial scalings of certain parameters.
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N = 42 units Waydo et al. (2006) Our fit
Best
S = 88 stimuli Data a1 = 0.23% a1 = 0.54% 84 neurons 105 neurons 126 neurons
Nr Responsive units 7.9 7.7 15.9 5.5 6.9 8.3
Sr Evocative stimuli 16.4 8.1 17.9 14 17 20
Sr, nr≥2 Fraction of stimuli with Nr ≥ 2 4.1% 0.44% 2.2% 1.4% 2.1% 2.9%
Table 1
Comparison of the per session data in Waydo et al. (2006) with the results of their one-population model, and with the predictions of our two-
population model, using its already-determined population parameters. In the two-population model, the number of neurons corresponding
to 42 units is adjustable, with the best result in the middle column. The data as well as the fit in the column headed a1 = 0.54% are those
in Waydo et al. (2006). For comments on the predictions in the last line, see the text.
They performed a Bayesian fit to the session-by-session
data on the joint probability of measuring Nr responsive
units and Sr evocative stimuli in a set of N units with S
presented stimuli. The probabilities in the model can be de-
rived from the underlying probability distribution (3), with
one further critical assumption, that firing in the different
neurons is independent.
As can be seen from the on-line supplementary mate-
rial for Waydo et al. (2006), not only is is quite difficult
to derive the distribution from the underlying distribu-
tion for the response of one neuron, but the resulting for-
mula involves a delicate cancellation of opposite-sign terms.
The formula therefore needs extreme care in numerical
work. However certain averaged quantities considered in
Waydo et al. (2006) are easier to derive, and in App. B we
present derivations that apply also to our two-population
model, given only the extra assumption of independence of
different neurons.
The main result of the analysis in Waydo et al. (2006)
is a distribution for sparsity, which is to be interpreted as
a posterior distribution in the Bayesian sense for the sin-
gle sparsity a1 of the neural population. We use the sym-
bol a1 for the sparsity to avoid confusion with the spar-
sity parameter of the distributed-code population in our
fits. When the same criterion for a neural response as in
Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) is used, the peak of the dis-
tribution is at a1 = 0.23%, which is therefore the best fit
according to the usual maximum likelihood criterion. The
distribution has a long asymmetric tail to large a1 and the
average value of the posterior distribution, at a1 = 0.54%,
is also a useful estimate of the value of a1.
These values are much lower than the value of a in our
two-population model, as is natural if the fit is to be a com-
promise between matching an ultra-low sparsity GM-like
population and a higher sparsity distributed-code popula-
tion. We see this quantitatively in Table 1, where we show
data and the results of their model fit and the predictions
of our model. The data are from Waydo et al. (2006) and
are an average over 34 sessions. One datum is the average
number of units Nr in one session that respond to at least
one stimulus, out of an average of S = 88 stimuli. Another
datum is the average number of stimuli Sr to which at least
one unit responds in a session, out of an average of N = 42
detected.
The one-populationmodel evidently has a choice, to have
a relatively low sparsity to get the correct number of respon-
sive units, or to have a relatively high sparsity to get the
correct number of evocative stimuli. Our two-population
model does considerably better. We can improve its results
by increasing the number of neurons a bit more relative to
the number of units than we originally supposed. Note that
from the first line of the table, the fraction of responsive
units is measured to be 7.9/42 = 19%. This is substan-
tially higher than the measurement for the same fraction
132/993 = 13% given in Quian Quiroga et al. (2005). So
the data are not completely consistent.
A final piece of session-averageddata given inWaydo et al.
(2006) is the fraction of stimuli that produced a (simulta-
neous) response in at least two neurons. In in App. B, we
derive a formula for this quantity. As with the number of of
evocative stimuli, a neglect of neuron-neuron correlations
is needed. The results are shown in the last line of Table
1. As already observed in Waydo et al. (2006), the one-
population model with their preferred value a1 = 0.54%
gives a fraction 2.2% that is rather below the data (4.1%).
A comparably bad fit is obtained by our two-population
model.
In fact, the bad fit happens quite generally. The formulae
for both Sr and Sr, nr≥2 given them in terms of a single
property of the model, the cell-averaged sparsity α¯. We
show in App. B, that when α¯N is not two large, the two
quantities obey an approximate relation
Sr, nr≥2
S
≃ 1
2
(
Sr
S
)2
. (19)
This relation is obeyed to useful accuracy in the model
calculations in the last two lines in Table 1, but it is violated
by a factor of two by the data. The derivation is not affected
by adding yet more populations of different sparsities, but
only by including neuron-neuron correlations.
There are in fact two simple ways to overcome this prob-
lem. One is simply that one fraction is proportional to the
number of detected units in a session, and the other is
proportional to its square. Since this number varied quite
widely (Waydo et al., 2006) between sessions (18 to 74),
the session average of N2 cannot be replaced by the square
of the average of N . This could easily account for the fac-
tor of two mismatch. In contrast, the fraction of evocative
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p = 93.9 stimuli Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) Waydo et al. (2006) Our fit
N = 993 units
Data a1 = 0.23% a1 = 0.54%
Responsive neurons with n = 1 51 174 305 Exact
Responsive neurons with n ≥ 2 81 20 92 Exact
〈n〉n≥2 4.1 2.1 2.2 Exact
Table 2
Comparison of results of Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) with the predictions of the one-population model of Waydo et al. (2006). Note that
the three parameters of our two-population model are determined from the three data values in this table.
stimuli is amenable to a simple average over sessions.
The second possibility is from neuron-neuron correla-
tions, to which Sr, nr≥2 is much more sensitive than the
other observables. If there were a small fraction of nearby
neurons that always fired in pairs, these would dispropor-
tionately contribute to Sr, nr≥2, but not nearly as much to
Sr.
Of course, both these suggestions can be tested by a
closer examination of the data.
We also examine how well the one-population model,
with the parameters from Waydo et al. (2006), agrees with
the data we used from the earlier paper (Quian Quiroga et al.,
2005). This is shown in Table 2. It can be seen that the
observables we used are particularly sensitive to the differ-
ences between the models. A low average sparsity is neces-
sary to keep the number of responsive neurons down to the
experimental value. But with a one-population model this
also implies that neurons with n ≥ 2 responses are many
fewer than those with n = 1 responses. Moreover the num-
ber of cells with even more responses than 2 is minute, so
that 〈n〉n≥2 is close to its minimum value of 2, whereas the
data is much higher. This is a clear indication of the need
for two populations of cells with very different sparsities.
We conclude that working with the distribution of the
number of responses by individual neurons (or units), as
we do, is preferable to the other distributions. The distri-
bution P (n|p) is easy to work with, and data can be use-
fully aggregated over a whole experiment, given only that
the number of stimuli is approximately the same in each
session and that the stimuli are chosen at random in some
large class. These conditions can be imposed by an experi-
menter. The model can always be systematically improved
by changing the sparsity distribution, e.g., by adding extra
components. Working with aggregate data keeps the sam-
pling errors usefully low, and parameters for a model can
be computed simply from properties of the aggregate data.
6.2. Abbott, Rolls, and Tovee
Other analyses of data, e.g., Abbott, Rolls and Tovee
(1996), have reported that hippocampal facially responsive
cells carry a distributed code as opposed to a GM-type
code. See also the recent work of Hung et al. (2005). These
analyses might appear to contradict our calculation that
distributed-code cells are a very small fraction, perhaps
less than 0.2% of the total. However, there is a strong bias
against actually detecting GM-like cells. In this section,
we use our fit to the more recent data to quantify this bias,
at least roughly, to determine whether there is consistency
between our results and the earlier data.
The primary issue is that experiments typically only re-
port those cells that are actually detected to respond to
at least one of the stimuli used. For example, in a paper
documenting place cell Thompson and Best (1989) state
“the electrode assemblies were advanced until one or more
hippocampal complex-spike cells were isolated extracellu-
larly.” Then they observe that cells that do not produce
any detectable spikes “are excluded from analysis here due
to our lack of ability to detect them”. Since GM-like cells
respond to a very small fraction of stimuli, the ones that
respond to no presented stimulus, i.e., the vast majority,
are typically omitted from an analysis.
The resulting bias can be seen in the data that we
analyzed earlier. A minority of the detected cells in
Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) are in the GM-like class (43
out of 132), even though we have shown that the GM-like
cells can be in the vast majority (99% or more).
With fewer stimuli, the bias becomes even stronger, as
in the data used by Abbott, Rolls and Tovee (1996). They
used 20 face stimuli, and the total number of facially respon-
sive neurons was 14. A rather higher sparsity was reported
than our result. But this is partly because a different def-
inition of sparsity was used, applied to the spike numbers
rather than to a binary response criterion. Furthermore the
cells have considerably larger background firing rates than
those in the new data.
Despite the differences in cells and species, we blindly
apply our model to give a rough test of consistency. In
our two-population model, the fraction of GM cells in the
detected cells is
p/Rˆ
p/Rˆ+ fD (1− e−pa)
=
1
1 +
202
p
(1− e−0.04p)
. (20)
This is the probability that a cell is a GM-like cell con-
ditional on the cell producing a detected response to one
or more of p stimuli. Notice that the silent-cell ratio K
cancels in this formula; we have a relation between num-
bers of different kinds of detected cell under different ex-
perimental conditions. We have estimates for the param-
eters of the model, so substituting p = 20 predicts a de-
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tected GM-cell fraction of 0.15, i.e., about 2 cells, in the set
of cells investigated in Abbott, Rolls and Tovee (1996). In
fact, Abbott, Rolls and Tovee (1996) did report that two of
their cells had a GM-like response. There is, of course, no
significance to the fact that this number is exactly the value
predicted: there are expected statistical fluctuations, and
the measurements were done with different methods and in
a different species than in Quian Quiroga et al. (2005).
Nevertheless it is very important that the previous re-
port, viewed as evidence in favor of distributed representa-
tions, is completely compatible with GM cells being in the
vast majority, with the parameters we have determined.
The undetected GM cells simply appear to be silent within
the experiment and are therefore classed as not facially re-
sponsive. Statements about the neural representation be-
ing distributed apply only to (most of) those cells that the
measurements actually detected, not to all cells in the rel-
evant region of the brain.
7. Discussion
The results of Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) clearly
suggest the detection of grandmother cells in the clas-
sic sense. Many other experiments have detected in-
dividual cells with strikingly specific responses (e.g.,
Hahnloser, Kozhevnikov and Fee (2002); Jung and McNaughton
(1993); Thompson and Best (1989)). Therefore it is useful
to hypothesize that some of these cells are indeed GM-like
cells, even though the concept of GM-cell may need to be
extended and modified.
A purely experimental direct test of the idea needs too
many stimuli to be practical, cf. Churchland and Sejnowski
(1992, p. 179). So other arguments must be brought in,
of which we have provided two. One uses an estimate of
the actual storage requirements for a memory system. We
showed that GM systems can be optimally efficient in the
use of synapses and neurons. The usual efficiency argument
applies only to the input representation, but now carries
the implication that in a GM-like system there must be two
populations of cells with widely different sparsities.
Our second argument is a method to analyze neural re-
sponses. A particular aim is to measure whether they are
quantitatively consistent there being separate neurons cod-
ing for each recognized person, or, alternatively, for each
individual declarative memory. Our method enables one to
determine whether or not individual cells necessarily code
for multiple persons or memories. We derived a general for-
mula Eq. (3) for the neural responses in terms of an under-
lying distribution of sparsity. Our expansion is a new result
and is applicable independently of any detailed theory or
model of neural function.
In effect, the formula enables us to extrapolate from lim-
ited data to obtain the fraction to stimuli to which cells re-
spond. It also allows us to compensate for the strong biases
involved in detecting cells when sparsities differ by very
large factors. Thus we obtain valid estimates of the num-
bers of cells of different kinds. We thereby solve some of
the issues raised by Olshausen and Field (2005) concern-
ing the publication of data only about responsive cells. One
primary remaining bias is that different neurons may have
different electrical characteristics, with a consequent differ-
ent maximum distance from the electrodes for detectability
of spikes. But this is presumably a milder effect than that
caused by orders of magnitude differences in sparsities.
7.1. Two populations essential
From the data we find indeed that the two-population
property is obeyed. Not only does the ultra-low-sparsity
population comprise the vast majority of cells in the brain
regions concerned (hippocampus, etc), but its sparsity can
be in a range compatible with the hypothesis of a GM-like
system: Roughly 10−3% with a repertoire of 105.
An important role is played by the many silent cells. It
is obviously unreasonable to assume they have no function.
But on the GM-cell hypothesis they naturally are to be
interpreted as themajority of GM cells that are not relevant
to the particular stimuli used in an experiment. The large
number of these cells is what enables one to overcome the
strong biases against detecting a response of any one GM
cell to a limited set of stimuli.
Now the group responsible for the analyzed data argue
(Quian Quiroga et al., 2005; Waydo et al., 2006) that their
data do not support the GM cell idea. In Waydo et al.
(2006), they say “if we assume that a typical adult recog-
nizes between 10,000 and 30,000 discrete objects (Bieder-
man, 1987), a = 0.54% implies that each neuron fires in
response to 50 – 150 distinct representations.” [a should be
replaced by a1 in the notation of the present paper.]
However their analysis assumed a single value of spar-
sity.While this is a suitable approximation for conventional
mechanisms of distributed memory, it is very bad for GM-
like systems. Even though the explicit aim of Waydo et al.
(2006) was to test the GM-cell hypothesis, the use of a sin-
gle sparsity in effect imposed an assumption that the hy-
pothesis is wrong.
We showed that the single-population hypothesis is a bad
fit to the data. Since our expansion (3) is very general, the
fault is in the single-population hypothesis not in any as-
sumption about neural properties. The rather low value of
sparsity given by Waydo et al. is merely a compromise be-
tween the widely different sparsities of the two populations.
Our results are consistent with an even higher number
of recognized objects than in the estimates of Biederman
(1987). Indeed, even without allowing for the silent cell cor-
rection, our fits allow a GM-cell population with a sparsity
of 1/4200 = 0.024% corresponding to a number of objects
not far from the lower edge of Biederman’s range.
Note that our basic estimate of the number of cate-
gories, 105, assumes that the cells are classic GM cells,
each responding to a single individual person. But the
number of categories could be substantially higher. If the
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cells are general memory cells, in the style of the model
of Baum, Moody and Wilczek (1988), they could respond
to images of several people. It could also be that more
familiar stimuli, with richer associations, have more cells.
In that case measurements with familiar stimuli, as is the
case in the data, would be biased towards these memories
with unusually large numbers of cells, with a correspond-
ing reduction in our estimate of the number of categories
compared with the true number.
7.2. Anatomy
InGM systems, like themodel of Baum, Moody and Wilczek
(1988), the number of GM cells is very much larger than
that of the input cells, as is consistent with the numbers we
have deduced. An immediate implication is that each GM
cell receives input from a modest number of input cells,
but that each input cell sends output to a much larger
number of memory cells. Given also our finding that the
GM cells in the relevant regions are in the vast majority,
there are some striking anatomical implications.
In fact striking disparities in synapse number are well
known in the hippocampus (Amaral, Ishizuka and Claiborne,
1970): For example, each CA3 pyramidal cell gets about
50 input synapses from dentate granule cells, while other
connections have tens of thousands of synapses. Note
that hippocampal neurogenesis results in dentate granule
cells, highly appropriate if they are GM-like. However,
general-purpose memories need a wider variety of (pro-
cessed) input than does a face recognition system, and
hippocampal-related regions are sufficiently complex that
the real picture is undoubtedly much more complicated.
Even so, a careful analysis of the disparities in synapse
number should provide critical information on neural func-
tion and the viability of GM-like systems.
7.3. Other arguments against GM systems
Other less quantitative arguments have been advanced
against the reality of GM systems, e.g., Churchland and Sejnowski
(1992); Rolls and Treves (1998).
For example, distributed memory systems are said to be
robust against partial destruction, since there is no single
location for a single memories. But we do know that mem-
ories disappear. If there are multiple GM cells for a mem-
ory in different places, then we can overcome the robust-
ness argument by simple redundancy. Moreover memories
form a network of knowledge, so that individual items of
semantic memory can be readily reconstructed from other
knowledge. Episodic memory is really an ordered sequence
of individual episodes, not necessarily remembered at all
precisely. Any one episode that disappears can be approx-
imately filled in from neighboring episodes.
Distributed memory systems are also said to be good at
filling in missing parts of input data, as in reconstructing
a full remembered image from a stimulus containing only
a part of the image. But this property can also be true
for GM-like systems. For example, when the BMW archi-
tecture (Baum, Moody and Wilczek, 1988) is used with a
sparse input representation and suitable dynamics for its
GM cells, it also performs pattern completion; the com-
pletion property is actually associated with properties of
sparse representations used for input data.
It has been said that new memories are harder to con-
struct in GM systems than in distributed-memory systems.
But now that adult neurogenesis in the hippocampus is well
established, it may well be that there is actually a pool of
new neurons available for at least some uses that could in-
clude being GM-like cells for new memories. The new neu-
ron rate may however be excessively small. In addition, it
is possible that the GM nodes are on dendritic tree rather
than being whole neurons. It is known that there can be
substantial changes in dendritic topology, which could eas-
ily include the formation of new nodes. Here the fundamen-
tal mode of operation is of a GM-like system while the neu-
ral code of memory neurons takes on some of the aspects
of distributed memory. In any case, there are potential re-
alistic mechanisms for the formation of new GM nodes, so
that there is no insuperable obstacle here.
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Appendix A. Model of neural firing
Our model for the statistics of neural firing has two cell
populations: one that uses a conventional distributed code
w th a single sparsity a and a second GM-cell population,
as illustrated in Fig. 6. These from fractions fD and fGM of
the total number of cells. A remaining population of cells
does not respond to any stimuli at all in the class used in
the experiment. We let k be the fraction of the images used
which have stored representations in the GM population,
we let R be the repertoire of the GM cells, and we let nm
be the typical number of categories (or GM groups) evoked
by a stimulus in the system’s repertoire. As before, we let
Reff = R/nm.
Suppose first we record from some random cell known to
be in the distributed population. We have seen that when
we present p images, the probability of getting n responses
is approximately the Poisson distribution in Eq. (2) with
α = a.
If, instead, we pick a GM cell, then for each individual
image it has a probability knm/R of responding. Therefore
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over a set of p≪ Reff unrelated images it has a probability
kp/Reff of responding exactly once. There is a negligible
probability of n ≥ 2 for such a cell.
Finally, if the cell is outside the above two populations,
it is silent in the experiment and always gives n = 0.
Summing over the distributions of n for cells of the dif-
ferent kinds, weighted by their fractional population size,
gives
P (n) ≃


1− fGM k p
Reff
− fD(1− e−pa) if n = 0,
fGM k p
Reff
+ fD pa e
−pa if n = 1,
fD(pa)
ne−pa
1
n!
if n ≥ 2.
(A.1)
This is of the form of the general distribution Eq. (3) with
D(α) = fD δ(α− a) + fGMk δ(α− 1/Reff)
+ (1− fD − fGMk) δ(α), (A.2)
and with the Poisson approximation approximation for the
distributed-code population and with the GM approxima-
tion that the GM-like cells fire so rarely that their responses
for n ≥ 2 can be neglected.
There are severalmeaningful parameters for theGMpop-
ulation, but only one combination affects the distribution
P (n). So we define Rˆ = Reff/(kfGM) = R/(nmkfGM), to
find
P (n) ≃


1− p
Rˆ
− fD(1− e−pa) if n = 0,
p
Rˆ
+ fD pa e
−pa if n = 1,
fD(pa)
ne−pa
1
n!
if n ≥ 2.
(A.3)
The parameter Rˆ has themeaning that if a cell is outside the
distributed-code population then it responds to a stimulus
in the chosen global class with probability 1/[Rˆ (1−fD)] ≃
1/Rˆ, where the last approximate equality applies in the
realistic case that fD is small, according to our fit.
We wish to extract the properties of the distributed-code
cells without contamination from the GM cells. For that
we need properties of the distribution for n ≥ 2, for which
we use the probability and the mean number of responses.
The probability of n ≥ 2 is
P (n ≥ 2) = fD
[
1− (1 + pa)e−pa] . (A.4)
The mean number of responses, in cells with n ≥ 2, is
〈n〉n≥2 =
∑
n≥2 nP (n)
P (n ≥ 2)
≃ pa (1− e
−pa)
1− (1 + pa)e−pa . (A.5)
These last two equations suffice to determine a and fD from
the data in Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) — see Eqs. (9) and
(10).
Appendix B. Further applications of model
Several further observables are considered byWaydo et al.
(2006). These observables refer to a session in which S
stimuli are presented to Nc cells or N units.
One observable is the number of neuronsNr that respond
to at least one stimulus. Its average is just the number of
cells or units times the probability that one cell or unit re-
sponds, which in our notation is P (n ≥ 1|S), in the nota-
tion of Eq. (3). Hence the number of responsive units in
one-population model of Waydo et al. (2006) is
P (n ≥ 1|S)×# units = (1− e−Sa1)N. (B.1)
In our two-population model it is
P (n ≥ 1|S)×Nc =
(
SK
Rˆ
+KfD(1− e−Sa)
)
Nc. (B.2)
We are not quite sure how many cells correspond to each
unit in the new data, so in Table 1 we gave results for
several choices of the ratio of cells to units, Nc/N : 2 (as we
estimated for the earlier data), 2.5, and 3.
A second observable is the number Sr of stimuli that
evoked a response in at least one neuron in the session.
To derive this from the response distributions requires a
further assumption that correlation between the firing of
different detected neurons can be neglected.
Now the probability of one stimulus evoking no response
in any of N independent cells (or units) is P (0|1)N , where
P (0|1) is the probability of no response in one cell/unit on
presentation of 1 stimulus. Hence the average number of
evocative stimuli in a session is
Sr = S
[
1− P (0|1)N ] . (B.3)
From Eq. (3), we find that in general P (0|1) = 1− α¯, where
α¯ is the sparsity averaged over cells. In the one-population
model of Waydo et al. (2006) we therefore get
Sr = S
[
1− (1− a1)N
]
, (B.4)
while in our two-population model it is
Sr = S
[
1−
(
1− K
Rˆ
−KfDa
)Nc]
. (B.5)
The appearance ofK in this last formula is misleading: the
dependence onK of Rˆ and fD in our fit cancels the explicit
factor of K. We have used the number of cells Nc in this
formula rather than the number of units N , since our fit is
made with respect to cells.
A final observable we consider is the number of stimuli
in a session that evoked responses in 2 or more cells/units.
This quantity, denoted Sr, nr≥2 can be obtained from the
distribution of the number of neurone responding to a single
stimulus:
P (nr for 1 stim.) = α¯
nr (1− α¯)N−nr N !
nr! (N − nr)!
≃ [N (1 − α¯)]
nr
nr
e−N (1−α¯), (B.6)
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It follows that on average
Sr, nr≥2 = S
[
1− (1− α¯)N −Nα¯(1− α¯)N−1] . (B.7)
From Eqs. (B.5) and (B.7), we get a relation between Sr
and Sr, nr≥2 valid when Nα¯ is less than about unity and N
is substantially larger than unity. We expand the powers of
1− α¯ for small α¯ to obtain
Sr
S
≃ Nα¯ if Nα¯ . 1, (B.8)
and then
Sr(Nr ≥ 2)
S
≃ (Nα¯)
2
2
≃ 1
2
(
Sr
S
)2
if Nα¯ . 1. (B.9)
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